Contributors: Vlad Sobell, Patrick Armstrong, Dale Herspring, Gordon Hahn, Edward Lozansky, Janusz Bugajski, Peter Rutland, Robert Bruce Ware, Eric Kraus, Donald Jensen and Ira Straus.

The word “Russophobia” is tossed around a lot today – usually as an invective to disagree with someone or an idea. However, it is my opinion that forms of “Russophobia” are deeply embedded in Western discourse regarding Russia – intentional and unintentional – and that it is not always in the form of political insults or personal nastiness.

Russia has long been an object, if not deemed as a bad idea, the West has used as a benchmark to define itself. Czarist despotism confirmed the West's confidence in its enlightened political and social institutions. Soviet communism demonstrated to the West that its belief in democracy and market economies were not only intellectually correct, but morally right. In both cases, Russia was the mirror opposite of how the West recognized itself.

The fact there was and continues to be ambivalence (and even hostility) toward Russia in the West is understandable. Old habits die-hard, old habits are familiar and, let's face it, old habits keep many members of the “commentariat” employed. Some Russia watchers trying to stay in the game should have long ago retired from the field.

Let's return to the term “Russocentric.” In defense of Russia's “own path” to modernizing and transforming itself, a number of Kremlin-connected spin-doctors and an even smaller number of Western pundits have invented a “Russocentric” position. This position – presenting itself as a unique and viable discursive mode – claims that just about everything that Russia's authorities do is correct because of circumstances on the ground and Russia's political culture. Isn't this approach simply a replication of the wrong-headed discourse of “Russophobia” as it is equally intellectually uncritical? Both discourses are inherently a dead-end when attempting to “explain” Russia – both are only grounded in defending preconceived political and ideological assumptions that have little to do with what they claim to be analyzing, which should be Russia.

Are “Russophobia” and “Russocentric” twins separated at birth? Shouldn't both be frowned upon? After all, Russia and what is happening to it is almost always lost in the shuffle. When can we accept that Russia is dealing with problems (some of them immense) without resorting to rhetoric such as “ do as you are told” and “we will do what we want?” Can we accept that Russia's problems are not unique, but solutions to remedy these problems may surprise and could be unexpected?

While there is a manifest oversupply of Russophobia, there is only a modest supply of what Peter Lavelle calls “Russocentrism.” Russophobia (a misleading term, which, for the want of a better word, we must continue to use) is generated by all of the factors Lavelle mentions.

This is the consequence of the sorry state of contemporary Russia watching community, whose dominant mainstream simply cannot come to terms with reality. This reality is that post-totalitarian Russia is evolving its own democracy. Unlike the post-war Germany and Japan, Russia has shaken off its totalitarian regime by its own efforts and is, therefore, free – in fact obliged – to shape its democracy without foreign intervention and lecturing. Russia cannot and will not return to authoritarianism (not to mention totalitarianism), simply because its experience of the disease has made it immune.

It is, therefore, profoundly depressing to witness the self-appointed guardians of democracy failing to grasp these facts and desperately searching for any “evidence” to prove that Russia is turning authoritarian. The resulting misrepresentation of its democratic evolution as “increasing authoritarianism” has surely been the hoax of the decade, with legions of respectable observers apparently willingly participating. Rarely has so important a country been so badly misinterpreted by so many.

Russocentrism is no more than re-assertion of self-respect and national pride, manifest in any self-respecting society. Alternatively, it could be seen as the regime's defense of its policies – a standard phenomenon in any normal country. Russocentrism may well have assumed unpleasant proportions among the Russian nationalists – but which normal democratic country does not have its loony fringe?

Russophobia should be abandoned for our own sake – misinterpreting Russia could have dangerous consequences. Abandoning it would also create a propitious climate for the curtailing of Russocentric excesses, because the Russians would become more open to external well-meant and constructive criticism.

Many Europeans take their pre-conceived notions with them to Russia and bring them home again, reinforced, as the recently deceased and greatly influential historian of Russia Martin Malia describes in his book “Russia Under Western Eyes.” Russia is mysterious, a little frightening; part European, part “oriental” but always a problem. And, unlike all the other places that Europe conquered over the last 500 years, Russia was too powerful to be overthrown. The "Russian problem" is a question of just what the thing is: Is it a European country which has gone to the dogs or is it an “oriental” state with which nothing can ever be done and which will always be on the wrong side of the fence?

“Russophobia” is the second of these views. Russophobes are prone to see the communist period as simply imperialist Russia with a red flag. And so we get remarks like these: Russian generals are “laying the groundwork for the restoration of the empire” (Richard Pipes, 1994); “Moscow's imperialist urge” (William Safire, 1995); “neo?imperialist Russia” (Ariel Cohen, 1996); “Russia is remarkably resistant to progress, material and moral” (George Will, 1999); “For four centuries, imperialism has been Russia's basic foreign policy” (Henry Kissinger 2000).

In short, Russia, whatever colour its flag is, is the eternal enemy. I have purposely picked old quotations to show how persistently Russophobes hold to their pre-conceptions.

One of the silliest examples of this was the description by someone on the Johnson Russia List, some years ago, of Stalin as a “Russianized Georgian”: Georgians good, Russians bad. Was Dzerzhinsky therefore a Russianized Pole? Latsis a Russianized Latvian? Trotsky a Russianized Jew? Mao a Russianized Chinese? Kim Il Sung a Russianized Korean? How ridiculous. The proper adjective is not “Russianized,” but “communist”.

But, many Russians are just as puzzled over what Russia actually is – “Eastern”, “Western” or something else. Historically, Russians seem to hold two opinions about the Russian content. One is that everything that is bad in Russia is “Russian”; the others that everything good is “Russian.” This latter group represents those whom Peter Lavelle calls “Russocentric.” These are the people – and there are too many of them in the presidential administration – who seem to think that there is a “Russian path” to democracy or prosperity.

Putin, however, is not one of these: “I can tell you that, in my view, we need not re-invent the wheel here. We should follow the path that is being travelled by all the industrialised and democratic countries.” (2002). The truth is that, while Russia will always be “Russian” (whatever that will mean over time and through change, it will be recognizably such) a wheel is a wheel; there is no such thing as a “Russian” wheel.

Neither the Russophobic nor the Russocentric concept holds much explanatory or predictive value – indeed, as predictive models, they are each singularly unsuccessful. Eventually these two points of view will die away, but I suspect, as Stalin might observe, the people who hold these views will have to die away before the views entirely disappear.

So far, I have not seen Putin do anything that I would call unexpected. Once I felt I understood the man, how he thinks, and works, it began to seem to me that he acted very rationally, and in accordance with what I would call Russian political culture. The problem for a lot of Western observers, in my opinion, was that they did not consider Russia unique – it did not deal with problems in a very Russian way.

Almost all countries are influenced by their own political culture. Chinese politics is influenced by Chinese political culture and Indian politics is influenced by India's many political cultures, which does not mean that there are not commonalities between different democratic polities. What it means is that a country like Russia takes those commonalities and interprets them in a distinctively Russian fashion. Some day we may find that distinctive ethnic cultures no longer play a role. It has happened before, but as even the British have discovered, one can think that political sub-cultures no longer play a major role, only to learn that the Scots and Welsh want more autonomy, more use of the indigenous languages, etc.

The biggest problem in my opinion comes from those like Jeffrey Sachs who try to impose a universal set of common behavioral assumptions on how countries like Russia operate – just like in Iowa or Kansas. Unfortunately, we learned that this effort to impose universalistic behavior patterns on the Russians was a disaster.

For this discussion, I would first try to define Russophobia. It is, in my view, the product of that group of scholars and observers who are of the school of thought that claims that Russian culture does not allow for Russia's democratization, and therefore Russia will always be authoritarian, imperialist, expansionist, and opposed to Western interests and the West itself. Thus, the research and writings of members of this school in any given period focus on those aspects of Russian life and politics that confirm this point of view. The foci are not always selected just to make Russia look bad; they are simply what many of these observers find interesting and important. They also find it rewarding in the sense that such work gives them the sense that they are fighting the good cause. Their righteousness allows them to unmask the deceitful Russians, and they alone hold the keys to understanding Russia's “true nature” and intentions. They are protecting the West, not only from Russians but from those who “do its bidding;” that is, those Russia observers in the West who either are opposed to their bias or are “Russocentric.” Those in the “Russophobia school” endeavor to place their people in positions where they can carry forward the message and to keep “pro-Russian” opponents out of the field.

As far as the Russo-centrists are concerned, they have disappeared since the fall of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War there was a quasi-“Russocentric” group by default, by virtue of the fact that sympathy for communism meant sympathy for the Soviet Union. In reality, however, communist sympathizers had no love of Russia and Russians per se, they loved communism. It would be hard to claim that Soviet sympathizers were Russocentric, given that Russia and Russians suffered, perhaps more than any others, from 70 years of Soviet rule. This is precisely why demands that Russia pay reparations to other former Soviet republics for the crime and loss of Soviet power is perhaps a good indicator of Russophobia, if not simply hateful anti-Russianism. The Cold War also grew the Russophobic school, as many were taught that in an at times simplistic fashion that Soviet communism was a logical outgrowth of Russian autocracy. Now, according to this view, a return to some form of Russian autocracy or even fascism is the logical outcome of the end of communism.

Russocentrists are now limited largely to a small group within the Russian ?migr? community. Some of the Russocentrism evident outside this small group is, in part, a reaction to the more prevalent Russophobia. Just as Russophilism comes largely from the Russian ?migr? community, we find that Russophobia is more prevalent among scholars and observers of Russia from East European ?migr? communities. Perhaps understandably, to a certain degree they bring the old battles from Europe to the West and to Western scholarship, journalism, and analysis. I fear that it was the Cold War that plagued the Russia-watching community with this barricade in a way that it did not those who examine other countries or do general comparative work.

Of course, scholars should not have sympathies toward one country or another in their work (except for perhaps their own, as long as their own is a democratic country), regardless of whether the bias is Russophobic or Russocentric. In this regard, for example, it would be natural to be wary about having a Palestinian as the sole analyst covering Israel, and visa versa, if one were running a governmental analysis unit, a think tank, or a newspaper. One would want to be careful that this Palestinian or Israeli is not biasing his or her analysis. The same would be true for the Russia watching institutions and community.

All this does not mean that many of the assertions of Russophobes (and Russophiles, but less so now) are not true, especially as Russia backtracks on democracy, but that, in a way, is precisely the problem. Legitimate criticism of Russia is being discredited in Russia now – in many cases depending on who the messengers are.

I want to address the problem of Russophobia in the West starting with semantics and terminology used by politicians, media and general public. For example, Peter Lavelle, in his introduction, properly used the term "Soviet" communism. However, President Dwight Eisenhower in his famous "Public Law 86-90 Captive Nations Week Resolution,” proclaimed on July 17, 1959, used the term "Russian" communism. This is the direct quote from this resolution: "... since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to the security of the United States and of all the free people of the world; ... the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led, through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Viet-Nam, and others."

In this declaration, in addition to inappropriately using term Russian, instead of Soviet, the American president makes several other mistakes. For example, he mentions pretty strange entities like White Ruthenia, Idel-Ural, and Cossackia. But the most important mistake is that he purposely omits Russia from the list of captive nations. By doing this, he directly implies that the Russians are the captors and it is they who are responsible for all the crimes committed by Communists.

In my opinion, Russia definitely was one of the Captive Nations and it was liberated together with other East European countries and all former Soviet republics on Eisenhower's list when Soviet communism collapsed. During the 1980s and 1990s, I sent quite a few letters to members of the U.S. Congress asking them to consider changing the wording of the above-mentioned resolution, but got nowhere.

I am also aware that, for many years, the Congress of Russian Americans has been trying to change the language of Captive Nations declaration by writing letters to all of the U.S. Presidents from Eisenhower to the current Bush but, so far, all their attempts have also failed. One should not be surprised if some Russian Americans would consider this as a proof of existing Russophobia in the West.

Of course, it is very interesting to know how ordinary people in Russia as well as their leaders and elites feel about this. Does the majority think that their country was enslaved by communism and therefore Russia had to be included in the Captive Nations list? It is not an academic question for, if this view is adopted, it follows that Russia cannot and should not be made responsible for the numerous crimes of the Soviet ruling class.

Recently, I asked President Putin the same question in my article in Izvestia. I have not received an answer so far. However, when I raised the same question during my discussions at the prestigious Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, I was pleasantly surprised that a lot of Russian philosophers agreed with my position.

“Russophobia” and “Russocentrism” are neither twins nor opposites. The opposite of “Russophobia” is surely “Russophilia.” “Russocentrism” is something qualitatively different from either concept. In common parlance “Russophobia” has at least two meanings. First, it literally signifies an obsessive fear of Russia. Unfortunately, such fear has significant resonance in neighboring countries that have been subjected to Russian government occupation, deportation, and repression in recent centuries, whether in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia. This fear partly abated under Yeltsin but has been augmented in recent years by Putin's more assertive foreign policy. In stark contrast, “Russophilia” signifies obsessive love of Russia in all its manifestations, regardless of the circumstances.

Second, in its more commonplace form, “Russophobia” is supposed to denote an irrational “knee-jerk” suspicion or even hostility to all things Russian and not just opposition to the incumbent government's agenda. Frequent users of this term tend to equate a reasoned if vehement criticism of Kremlin policy with some primordial “anti-Russianism” and thereby conveniently avoid challenging the actual criticism. Moreover, a few commentators assume that, because of someone's ethnic background or political persuasion, critical comments about Russian state policy are in their essence both prejudicial and irrational. Such dismissive assertions do not enhance scholarship but are themselves a valuable subject of study.

“Russophobe watchers” assume that critical commentators are linked with “anti-Russian” policy makers in the West and are automatically “hostile to Russia.” Such suppositions are simple-minded and merely feed into the widening chasm between Putin backers and Putin critics. An interpretation of official Russian policy that pinpoints how the Kremlin is seeking to rebuild Russia's zones of influence and is restoring an authoritarian system does not necessarily assume that Russia is on the “wrong track.” The “Russophile” dismissal of “Russophobes” thereby becomes convoluted and contradictory because, presumably for the stereotypical “Russophobe,” Moscow should not be on the “right track” at all, as this would undermine the “Russophobes'” allegedly negative predispositions toward Russia.

“Russocentrism” also has several meanings, some positive and others negative. If it describes an individual focused on observing Russian developments from the inside and accurately portraying and interpreting various Russian positions toward the outside world, then “Russocentrics” are essential. However, if such an individual dismisses similar “centric” interpretations from the United States, Poland, Ukraine or Georgia as “Russophobic” then this stifles constructive analysis and debate. Such “Russocentrics” then expose themselves to denunciation as “Americaphobes” or “Polophobes,” and so on. If added to this is an assumption that Russia is on the “right track” and its leadership should not be admonished by suspicious Westerners, then discourse becomes almost pointless, as it mirrors the circular arguments between religious believers and non-believers.

I take “Russophobia” to mean an irrational or groundless fear or dislike of Russia. In current debates it usually denotes the Russian state, as opposed to Russian culture or Russian people. Just because somebody criticizes the Russian state does not immediately make him or her a “Russophobe,” any more than someone who criticizes the war in Iraq is automatically anti-American.

The important thing is to separate irrational hatred of Russia from criticism based in concrete actions on the part of the Russian state. The actions of the Soviet state gave lots of people good reason to fear Russia, especially people in neighboring countries that were invaded and occupied by Soviet troops – who only withdrew some 10 years ago. These neighbors really do want to believe that the Russian state is not like its Soviet predecessor.

The opposite of “Russophobia” should be “Russophilia” (an irrational love of Russia) and not “Russocentrism” (a tendency to see everything revolving around Russia, or maybe to look at things from a Russian point of view). Maybe Peter Lavelle prefers “Russocentric” because “Russophilia” typically refers to culture and not geopolitics. But the question of whether Russia's influence in the world is good or bad is separate from the question of whether that influence is waxing or waning. Both Russophobes and Russophiles tend to exaggerate Russia's influence.

A Google search produces 25,700 hits for Russophobia and just 761 for Russophilia. That does not prove that there is more Russophobia out there – it probably just means that there are more people complaining about it.

The “Russocentric” perspective is a direct product of the predominantly Russophobic paradigm that has been prevalent in the West at least since Astolphe de Custine's “Letters from Russia” in 1839. This paradigm chronically and ubiquitously concentrates its attention upon that which is least favorable about the situation in Russia, and omits that which is either praiseworthy or exculpatory. Any writer with a knowledge of Russia and a commitment to truth and objectivity will sooner or later feel compelled to balance the Russophobic account by presenting the other side of the picture. Then Russophobic practitioners attack that presentation as unduly favorable to Russia.

Russophobic critics often tell me that, while they regard my work on Dagestan to be balanced and objective, they find my work on Chechnya to be imbalanced, unobjective, anti-Chechen, and pro-Russian. I tell them that in my work on Dagestan I have been left alone to tell all sides of the story without having to confront forums that have been prepared by hundreds of other writers offering only one side of the story, as has been the case with most discussions of Chechnya.

Over the last several years I have tried to present a picture of Dagestan as seen by many Dagestanis, and I have sought to present a picture of Chechnya as seen by the overwhelming majority of Chechens. These are the Chechens who despise the separatists, militarists, radicals, and adventurers for the chaos that they have wrought. They are the Chechens who wish to see Chechnya within the Russian Federation, if only for the sake of order and stability. Unfortunately, the story of the majority of Chechens is consistent with the romantic fantasies and Russophobic hysteria of most Western writers on only a single point: Most Chechens have suffered appalling abuse by Russian federal forces. So this is the only side of their story that is presented in the West. We hear nothing, for example, about the appalling abuse that most Chechens suffered at the hands of other Chechens from 1997 to 1999. Any writer who attempts to balance the predominantly romantic/Russophobic picture of the Chechens must endure relentless personal attacks and ostracism.

The simple fact is that in all human affairs, one extreme inevitably generates its opposite. That has been true of the polarization in Chechnya and it has been true among in the communities of Western Russia watchers. Polarizations of this sort are rarely productive because they are generally unrealistic.

As a dyed-in-the-wool “Russocentric” I find that the terms of discourse have been almost comically mis-defined. Perhaps as a hangover from the Cold War, the United States establishment continues to define much of “Western” discourse as regards Russia. This was best illustrated by the fierce reaction of Washington when their well-thought-out play to gain substantial leverage over the Russian oil industry was suddenly checkmate by the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Indeed, one is sometimes reminded of that bumper sticker, which sarcastically enquires – How did “our” oil get under their sands?

Russia is a sovereign state and, like every other sovereign state, has not “friends” but interests. Russia is facing a steep learning curve with regards to its crude diplomacy, but Western bungling in Russia's near abroad has been equally counterproductive. The United States has succeeded in a goal that eluded generations of Soviet policymakers – cementing a military and diplomatic alliance between Russia and China. The United States is being pushed out of the “Stans,” while the recent political theatre in Kiev has left us with the uproarious spectacle of the rent-a-foundations (prominently, the Yukos-funded Carnegie) warning of the spread of an Orange Revolution to Moscow…perhaps first it must spread to Ukraine! It is unfortunate that, in reaction to the triumphlist rhetoric about isolating Russia, the Kremlin has responded by supporting any friendly regime on Russia's borders, no matter how unsavory. There is ample precedent – those major powers currently most generous with advice have long done likewise in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

Washington appears to have recently become a great deal more realistic regarding their degree of leverage. The new U.S. ambassador has been uncharacteristically low key, and of late we have heard nary a peer out of the White House regarding Khodorkovsky. He should sue them for having misled him in the first place!

The issue is thus not one of Russophilia or Russophobia. Perhaps some Russia realism is called for. Times have changed and, indeed, the utter failure of the miscarried “liberal reform” of the early 1990s has discredited the Washington consensus. The challenge now facing Western commentators and politicians is to come to terms with the fact that Western views have become deeply irrelevant to the Kremlin. The North Baltic pipeline to Germany, coupled with Putin's signing of deals to extend the pipeline to Belgium and onwards to the United Kingdom, mean that Russia becomes the vital energy source for Europe. Those countries that wish to engage Russia will be rewarded with access to the burgeoning Russian market. The others will most likely simply be ignored. Given the endogenous growth rate in Western Europe, while this is rather less problematic than the threat of Soviet tanks, it should nevertheless focus minds most wondrously.

I dislike both words, “Russocentric” and “Russophobic.” Both are simplistic terms that seriously distort the key differences between two important views regarding how Russia is ruled and what its future might be.

Russia deserves to be wished well - even helped, if that help can be constructively used. But many foreigners are critical for good reason. Russia has a proclivity for bullying its neighbors, corruption is widespread, it is still ambivalent about its Stalinist past and still harbors an unjustified messianism. These and other issues are raised frequently in this space, not least by me, and there is no reason to delve into them again. Noting them does not make one Russophobic, so long as they are grounded in fact and balanced with an appreciation of their positive things going on (too often one hears from Russia's “defenders” that a critic is “anti-Russian.” That is ridiculous. One would never describe a critic of, say, the Slovak government, as “anti-Slovak”). At the same time, many Westerners do unfairly demonize Russia. They see it as a continuation of the “evil” Soviet empire and do not grasp its complexity. This is, to a significant extent, our own fault. Americans tend to universalize our own values, underestimate the role of history and culture and assume that the political processes in other country work as ours do.

Russia centrism is also unfortunate. It is a way for Russia to define its identity vis-a-vis the West (here I disagree with you strongly – the process is the reverse of what you describe, to use concepts such as Eurasianism to justify Russian imperialism or to argue that Russia is somehow exempt from the laws that govern other market economies. With due regard for the distinctiveness of Russian history, I think that such views will ultimately prove tragic for the country.

Questions about Russia's future, who governs it, or what difference it makes who governs can best be answered by linking the analysis of Russia's institutions and political processes to explanations of why and how major decisions are made as they are. Conclusions, if any, about whether Russia is a democracy, whether Putin is rolling it back or if Russia will follow a unique path are nothing more than conjecture if they are not based on painstaking examination of how Putin, or the presidential administration, or the “Siloviki,” or Big Business or regional leaders actually affect, or fail to affect, a broad range of policy questions. This is more tedious and more demanding than hurling epithets at think tank lunches or faculty meetings, but in the long run will be more fruitful.

The adjectival pair – pro-Russian, anti-Russian – can be applied descriptively to individual persons or analyses without any necessary deep ideological connotations. The nouns, by contrast, denote global approaches to Russia that form a major part of the identity of a person or school of thought.

Russocentrism is explicit about being an “ism,” i.e. an ideology, with totalistic connotations. Russophobia, a label that is applied by its critics, not its actual exponents, is defined as a “phobia,” i.e. an obsession, with similarly totalistic connotations.

America is another country with which the world has an obsession, and that has an obsession with itself. The Cold War raised the question of one's attitude toward America and its massive ideology on the one side, the Soviet Union and its total ideology on the other, to a decisive issue almost everywhere. There are also “Europeanists” (advocates of the EU and its further strengthening) and “Europhobes.” The latter call themselves “Euroskeptics” (and their opposites “Euro-enthusiasts”), although there is scarcely a trace of skepticism in them, they are so consistent in their negativism toward Europe; “Euronegativism” would be more accurate.

At the same time, there have also been crude oversimplifications of these analyses of anti-Americanism, using them for dismissing anyone who criticizes America. Sometimes the brilliant authors themselves slip into such misuse of the term. It is, after all, an easy way out for dealing with criticism, a ready aid to laziness. This in turn provides a sense of intellectual authority for the lumpen patriots, who use the term “anti-American” to slander any and every critic.

The same thing happens among Russians who analyze “Russophobia.” They have a great theme and sometimes make profound analyses. They also tend to mix it with knee-jerk use of the term to dismiss any serious criticism of Russia, and give moral support to the Russian super-patriots who do this as a matter of fixed habit. The latter, like their American counterparts, tend to have an inferiority complex. They tend to compensate by asserting their country's superiority and explaining away criticism as a result of envy (the American versions, “they envy our wealth,” “they hate our freedom;” the Russian version, “they envy and fear our organic community that hasn't been destroyed by individualism like the societies of the West's).

The very idea that there is a “the Russian idea” is a romantic absurdity. Russia is a country, not a philosopher spinning out an intellectual world-system. If Russia is the embodiment of anything, it is of a people and a history. Its people bear many ideas; it is not the embodiment of a particular idea, or the Hegelian working out of an idea in history. To be sure, it works out its ideas in history; but it does so in interaction with others, not as a separate organism built on an original prenatal idea.

The term “Russophobe” refers to people who do not just rationally and episodically criticize Russia, but are consistently negative on Russia, obsessively fearful of Russia, and reach for the “blame Russia first” posture (or “Russia as the underlying cause” explanation) for practically every problem where Russia has any bearing.

Such “Russophobes” clearly exist, even if it can reasonably be debated whether “phobia” or “hatred” is a more accurate term for describing their obsession. It is not hard to find them. Major constituencies for Russophobia are to be found in former Cold War milieus and in nationalist milieus in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space. At the same time, portions of the Russian intellectual class, like intellectuals everyone, get off on feeling superior to their common countrymen. The Russia-bashing Russians are cited by Russophobes abroad, giving a veneer of legitimacy to their own more darkly motivated ravings.

Equally clearly, “anti-Americans” exist – people who criticize American obsessively, blame it for just about everything that goes wrong, and regularly use language of ridicule and hate for America. Substantial constituencies for anti-Americanism are to be found all around the world nowadays, given America's global predominance. They are particularly widespread in the intellectual classes, where there is resentment that the American power structure doesn't sufficiently consult them and take their advice. Their home base is, ironically, the intellectual class of America itself, large swathes of which share the same resentment.

The consequences of Russophobia may seem less important globally than those of anti-Americanism, especially after 9-11. However, Russophobes have done plenty of radical harm of their own. The sharp, revolutionary character of changes in Russia has given the world both a need and an opportunity for a radical reconstruction of relations with Russia, and Russophobes have done decisive work in preventing it. They have had greater successes than they perhaps realize in obstructing the tremendous potential that existed after the end of Communism for development of allied relations between Russia and the West. And this has had global consequences damaging for nearly everyone. It was specifically helpful to the very Talibanists and terrorists who struck America on 9-11. The Russian nuclear arsenal remains a danger to the world, especially in conditions where lots of people on both sides seem determined to achieve a re-alienation of Russia from the world order.

The American and Russian super-patriots have meanwhile done their own share to push their great countries into trouble, and the world with them. Americans, when they have gotten too heavily into super-patriotism, have spoken of “100-percent Americanism.” In the name of preserving America's freedom from corrupting European influences, it nearly cost the entire world its freedom, and America with it, in the opening stages of World War II. Russian super-patriots are equally oblivious to the real needs of their country – its real opportunities, its real limitations, its real dangers, which are bound up organically with the opportunities and dangers facing all of the European civilization that Russia is a part of including America – preferring a fantasy world of a “Russocentric” Russia that centers itself around something that it calls “the Russian idea.” The actual ideas of the historical Russia overlap with those of its neighboring societies and are, for the most part, not just overlapping with but embedded within the vast processes of European development. The same applies to the actual ideas of America that emerged out of modern European history.

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